UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines For Assessing The International Protection Needs Of Asylum-Seekers From Sri Lanka
July 6, 2010 at 10:34 am · Posted Public Articles
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
5 July 2010
UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines are issued by the Office to assist decision-makers, including UNHCR staff,
Governments and private practitioners, in assessing the international protection needs of asylum-seekers.
They are legal interpretations of the refugee criteria in respect of specific profiles on the basis of assessed
social, political, economic, security, human rights and humanitarian conditions in the country/territory of
origin concerned. The pertinent international protection needs are analyzed in detail, and recommendations
made as to how the applications in question relate to the relevant principles and criteria of international
refugee law as per, notably, the UNHCR Statute, the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, and relevant
regional instruments such as the Cartagena Declaration, the 1969 OAU Convention and the EU
Qualification Directive. The recommendations may also touch upon, as relevant, complementary or
subsidiary protection regimes.
UNHCR issues Eligibility Guidelines to promote the accurate interpretation and application of the above-
mentioned refugee criteria in line with its supervisory responsibility as contained in paragraph 8 of its
Statute in conjunction with Article 35 of the 1951 Convention and Article II of its 1967 Protocol and based
on the expertise it has developed over the years in matters related to eligibility and refugee status
determination. It is hoped that the guidance and information contained in the Guidelines will be considered
carefully by the authorities and the judiciary in reaching decisions on asylum applications. The Guidelines
are based on in-depth research, information provided by UNHCR’s global network of field offices and
material from independent country specialists, researchers and other sources, rigorously reviewed for
reliability. The Guidelines are posted on UNHCR’s Refworld website at http://www.refworld.org.
Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………3
I. INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….1
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION …………………………………………………………………………………….1
III. ELIGIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION……………………………………………………3
A. POTENTIAL RISK PROFILES…………………………………………………………………………………………………….3
1. Persons Suspected of Having Links with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)………………..3
2. Journalists and Other Media Professionals …………………………………………………………………………….5
3. Civil Society and Human Rights Activists………………………………………………………………………………..6
4. Women and Children with Certain Profiles …………………………………………………………………………….7
5. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Individuals……………………………………………………9
B. INTERNAL FLIGHT OR RELOCATION ALTERNATIVE ……………………………………………………………………9
C. EXCLUSION FROM INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE PROTECTION ………………………………………………………10
IV. CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….13
I. Introduction
These Guidelines are issued in the context of the improved human rights and security situation
following the end of the armed conflict between the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) and the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009, and are intended for the use of UNHCR and State
adjudicators in the assessment of claims by Sri Lankan asylum-seekers.1 They supersede the April
2009 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-
Seekers from Sri Lanka and the subsequent Note on the Applicability of the 2009 Sri Lanka
Guidelines.2
The Guidelines contain information on the particular profiles for which international protection needs
may arise in the current context. Given the cessation of hostilities, Sri Lankans originating from the
north of the country are no longer in need of international protection under broader refugee criteria or
complementary forms of protection solely on the basis of risk of indiscriminate harm. In light of the
improved human rights and security situation in Sri Lanka, there is no longer a need for group-based
protection mechanisms or for a presumption of eligibility for Sri Lankans of Tamil ethnicity
originating from the north of the country. It is important to bear in mind that the situation is still
evolving, which has made the drafting of these Guidelines particularly complex.
II. Background Information
On 19 May 2009, the Government of Sri Lanka formally declared victory over the LTTE after
capturing the last LTTE-controlled territories in the north of the country.3 This marked the end of a
26-year non-international armed conflict.
At the time of writing, the security situation in Sri Lanka had significantly stabilized, paving the way
for a lasting solution for hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country’s
north and east. In August 2009, the Sri Lankan Government began to organize the return or release
from IDP camps of some 280,000 persons, who were forced to flee their homes during the final phase
of the conflict.4 Many of the initial restrictions on the freedom of movement of IDPs have been lifted,5
and by mid-June 2010, approximately 246,000 persons had left the displacement camps to return to
their places of origin or live with host families, relatives and friends. More returns are expected to
take place within the coming weeks and months. A number of those who left the camps remain,
however, in a situation of displacement due to the total or partial destruction of their homes and the
ongoing de-mining operations.6 Furthermore, IDP return has in some cases been hindered by land
disputes arising from a number of issues, such as secondary occupation; the occupation of land by the
1
These Guidelines are based on information available to UNHCR as of May 2010, unless otherwise stated.
2
UNHCR, UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Sri Lanka, April
2009, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49de0b6b2.html; and UNHCR, Note on the Applicability of the 2009 Sri Lanka
Guidelines, July 2009, Rev., http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a6817e22.html.
3
The Official Website of Mahinda Rajapaksa Presidential Campaign 2010, Address by HE President Mahinda Rajapaksa at the
ceremonial opening of Parliament, Sri Jayawardhanapura – Kotte, 19 May 2009, http://www.mahinda2010.lk/ceremonial-openingof-
parliament-may-2009.html; and BBC News, Country profile: Sri Lanka, last updated on 5 May 2010,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/country_profiles/1168427.stm.
4
See, for example, Human Rights Watch, World Report 2010 -Sri Lanka, 20 January 2010,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b586ce080.html.
5
In December 2009, for example, a pass system was put in place to allow IDPs to leave camps for a period of up to two weeks. It was,
however, reported that the implementation of the pass system differed in the various camps and that persons suspected of LTTE
affiliations were denied passes altogether; see Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global Overview of Trends and
Developments in 2009 -Sri Lanka, 17 May 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4bf2526cd.html.
6
The Government has announced plans to resettle all the remaining IDPs of the north by September 2010 and to close all “welfare
villages” in the same timeframe; see The Official Government News Portal of Sri Lanka, Gradual shutting down of welfare villages
takes place, 28 May 2010, http://www.news.lk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=15487&Itemid=44. See also
UNHCR, Sri Lanka: returns and shelter grants restart, 27 April 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/4bd6d3226.html. Over 60,000 Muslim
IDPs remained displaced in Puttalam, 20 years after being forced out of the north and north-west by the LTTE in 1990; see Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2009 -Sri Lanka, 17 May 2010,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4bf2526cd.html. In December 2009, the Government announced that it would start resettling
more than 100,000 Muslim IDPs from camps in Uttalam to their places of origin; see IRIN, Sri Lanka: Difficult homecoming for
Muslim IDPs, 22 March 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4bb06c8414.html.
military and LTTE during the conflict, including the arbitrary seizure of land belonging to Muslims
by the LTTE in the north and east; the establishment of High Security Zones (HSZ) and Special
Economic Zones (SEZ); and the loss of documentation.7
Other measures taken by the Government since the end of the conflict, such as the relaxation of
emergency legislation, marked a shift towards a peacetime agenda. Restrictions on the freedom of
movement have also been eased as a consequence of the improvement in the security situation.8
However, other security measures, including military/police checkpoints along the main roads and a
highly visible military presence, continue to be maintained throughout the country,9 reportedly to
prevent the re-establishment of the LTTE by cadres still at large.10
Sri Lanka has experienced significant political developments during the first half of 2010. The
country went to the polls in January to elect a new president,11 and in April to elect the first
Parliament of the post-conflict era.12 Furthermore, some areas of the north such as Kilinochchi and
Mullaitivu districts that had previously been under the control of the LTTE for decades are now
governed by the central authorities.
In response to calls for an independent international investigation into allegations of human rights and
international humanitarian law violations by the parties to the conflict,13 the Government of Sri Lanka
has recently announced the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission mandated to
examine the “lessons to be learnt from events” between February 2002 and May 2009.14 On 22 June
2010, the UN Secretary-General also appointed a Panel of Experts mandated to advise on the issue of
7
Thousands of IDPs displaced from Jaffna and Trincomalee Districts pre-2008 remain unable to return due to the fact that their areas
of origin had been designated as HSZ; see Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global Overview of Trends and Developments
in 2009 -Sri Lanka, 17 May 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4bf2526cd.html; and Centre for Policy Alternatives, Land in
the Eastern Province: Politics, Policy and Conflict, 13 May 2010,
http://www.cpalanka.org/file.download.php?fileName=attach/722/Land in the Eastern Province-Politics, Policy and Conflict.pdf. In
the northern Jaffna Peninsula alone, 15 High Security Zones have reportedly been established since the 1990s, covering 160 square
kilometres or 18 percent of the peninsula’s land mass; see Sujeewa Amaranath, Sri Lanka: Permanent military occupation of the
North and East, 23 March 2010, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2010/mar2010/sril-m23.shtml. Following the parliamentary elections
in April 2010, the local Government in Jaffna has promised to gradually remove the HSZs; see AsiaNews, Government promises to
remove the High Security Zone. Hopes for Tamil refugees, 13 April 2010, http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Government-promises-toremove-
the-High-Security-Zone.-Hopes-for-Tamil-refugees-18130.html. The right to property restitution or adequate compensation is
enshrined in the Pinheiro Principles; see UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Principles on
Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons, 28 June 2005, principle 2.1,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/41640c874.html.
8
For example, in July 2009, the A9 Jaffna-Kandy highway, the only land route connecting the capital with the northernmost part of the
country, was reopened; see Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2010 -Sri Lanka, 1 June 2010,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c1a1e9b25.html.
9
Roadblocks may, reportedly, be established without warning; see Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Sri Lanka:
Travel Advice, current as of 17 June 2010, http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/advice/sri_lanka.
10
In January 2010, President Rajapaksa stated that Sri Lanka still faced a severe threat from separatists, although the LTTE had been
militarily crushed. Some LTTE cadres were believed still to be at large and to account for as many as 10 percent of the total
population in Jaffna District. See South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) of the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), LTTE:
Diaspora Wars, 14 June 2010, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/#assessment1.
11
Incumbent President Rajapaksa won 57.88 percent of the votes, whilst former Commander of the SLA, General Fonseka, obtained
40.15 percent; see Sri Lanka Department of Elections, Presidential Election 2010 – Official Results, accessed 29 May 2010,
http://www.slelections.gov.lk/presidential2010/AIVOT.html. The elections were largely peaceful, although there were some reports
of some post-election violent incidents between party activists, resulting in one death and some injuries; see Commonwealth
Secretariat, 2010 Sri Lanka Elections -Final Report, 15 February 2010,
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/document/181889/34293/35144/220094/final_report__sri_lanka_cet.htm.
12
The ruling United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) coalition won 144 of 225 seats, representing 60 percent of the vote; see
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch No. 81, 1 May 2010,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/CrisisWatch/2010/cw81.ashx; and The Island, UPFA bags Kandy, Trinco, bolsters its
historic win, 21 April 2010, http://www.island.lk/2010/04/21/news18.html.
13
See, for example, Amnesty International, UN must investigate Sri Lanka rights violations, 17 May 2010,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/un-must-investigate-sri-lanka-rights-violations-2010-05-17; US Department of
State, 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices -Sri Lanka, 11 March 2010,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b9e52bbc.html; and Human Rights Watch, World Report 2010 -Sri Lanka, 20 January 2010,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b586ce080.html.
14
For further information, see the Official Government News Portal of Sri Lanka, ‘101 East’, Al Jazeera interview transcript, 27 May
2010, http://www.news.lk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=15477&Itemid=52; IRIN, Sri Lanka: Truth commission
dogged by scepticism, 19 May 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4bf633a217.html; Human Rights Watch, Sri Lanka:
Government Proposal Won’t Address War Crimes, 7 May 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4be90b752c.html; and
Amnesty International, Twenty Years of Make-Believe: Sri Lanka’s Commissions of Inquiry, June 2009,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA37/005/2009/en/c41db308-7612-4ca7-946d-03ad209aa900/asa370052009eng.pdf.
accountability with regard to any alleged violations of international human rights and humanitarian
law during the final stages of the conflict in Sri Lanka.15
The end of the armed conflict and the significantly improved security conditions throughout the
country have resulted in a reduction in the number of Sri Lankans seeking international protection in
industrialized countries. During the period from January to June 2010, 2,947 asylum applications have
been registered – compared to 4,573 applications registered during the same period in 2009 –
representing a 35 percent decrease.16
III. Eligibility for International Protection
The status of recognized refugees should be reviewed only if there are indications, in an individual
case, that there are grounds for cancellation of refugee status which was wrongly granted in the first
instance; revocation of refugee status on the grounds of Article 1F of the 1951 Convention; or
cessation of refugee status on the basis of Article 1C(1-4) of the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees (1951 Convention). UNHCR considers that the current situation in Sri Lanka,
although significantly improved in the last twelve months, does not yet warrant cessation of refugee
status on the basis of Article 1C(5) of the 1951 Convention.
All claims by asylum-seekers from Sri Lanka should be considered on their individual merits in fair
and efficient refugee status determination procedures and taking into account up-to-date and relevant
country of origin information. UNHCR considers that, depending on the particular circumstances of
the case, some individuals with profiles similar to those outlined below require a particularly careful
examination of possible risks. This listing is not necessarily exhaustive and is based on information
available to UNHCR at the time of writing, hence a claim should not automatically be considered as
without merit because it does not fall within any of the profiles identified below. Some of the claims
lodged by asylum-seekers from Sri Lanka will require examination of possible exclusion from refugee
status.
A.
Potential Risk Profiles
1. Persons Suspected of Having Links with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
In the wake of the conflict, almost 11,00017 persons suspected of LTTE links were arrested and
detained in high-security camps, while over 500 former child soldiers18 were transferred into
rehabilitation centres.19 By the end of May 2010, all former LTTE-associated child soldiers had
15
UN, Secretary-General Names Panel of Experts to Advise on Accountability for Possible Rights Violations during Sri Lanka Conflict,
22 June 2010, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2010/sgsm12967.doc.htm. The establishment of the Panel was considered “as an
unwarranted and unnecessary interference with a sovereign nation” by the Sri Lanka Government; see the Official Website of the
Government of Sri Lanka, Govt. opposes UN Panel, 23 June 2010,
http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca201006/20100623govt_opposes_un_panel.htm.
16
According to statistics compiled by UNHCR in relation to 44 industrialized countries in Europe, North America, Oceania and Asia.
Figures valid as of 30 June 2010.
17
According to a Government survey, as of 1 March 2010, 10,781 LTTE cadres were being held at 17 centres. Among the detainees
were 8,791 males and 1,990 females; see Sri Lanka Ministry of Defence, Survey reveals how Tigers threw untrained children into
Vanni battle, 15 March 2010, http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20100315_08.
18
Recruitment of child soldiers, often forcibly, was practiced by both the LTTE and the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), a
break-away group from the LTTE that aligned itself with the Government during the last phase of the conflict; see International Crisis
Group, War Crimes in Sri Lanka, 17 May 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4bf13c072.html; and Office of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Mission Report: Visit of Major General (ret.) Patrick
Cammaert, Special Envoy of the Special Representative for Children & Armed Conflict, to Sri Lanka, 05-11 December 2009, 20
February 2010, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2010.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/SNAA-83W4HHfull_
report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf. The LTTE allegedly recruited and abducted thousands of children throughout the conflict, some
as young as 11 years, to serve in combat and in various battlefield support functions; see Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers,
Briefing to the UN Security Council working group on Sri Lanka, February 2010, http://www.childsoldiers.
org/document/get?id=1585.
19
UN Secretary-General (UNSG), Children and armed conflict: report of the Secretary-General, A/64/742 -S/2010/181, 13 April
2010, para. 22, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4bfcce6a2.html.
reportedly been released from rehabilitation centres.20 Some of the adult detainees have also been
released after completing rehabilitation programmes or because they were no longer deemed to
present a risk, including some persons with physical disabilities.21 By May 2010, around 9,000 alleged
former LTTE cadres reportedly remained in closed camps.22
In the immediate post-conflict period, there have been allegations of enforced disappearances of
persons suspected of LTTE links.23 Furthermore, the broad powers of arrest and detention under the
Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA)24 and the Emergency Regulations,25 have reportedly generated
considerable controversy around issues such as the arrest and detention of persons suspected of LTTE
links, in a number of cases allegedly on limited evidence and often for extended periods.26 Human
rights observers have also expressed concerns regarding the broadly defined offences under the
Emergency Regulations,27 which allow, inter alia, detention without charge for up to 18 months,28 and
use of informal places of detention.29 In May 2010, the Government, however, relaxed the Emergency
Regulations30 by withdrawing several provisions, including those dealing with the imposition of
curfews, propaganda activities, printing of documents and distributing them in support of terrorism, as
well as those restricting processions and meetings considered detrimental to national security.31
Amongst issues relevant to the determination of eligibility for refugee protection are allegations by a
number of sources regarding: torture of persons suspected of LTTE links in detention;32 death of
20
See BBC News, Child soldiers released, 26 May 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2010/05/100526_
childsoldiers.shtml. It is reported that 183 children, who had been released prior to 18 January 2010, have only received a temporary
ID card issued by the Terrorist Investigation Unit; see Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and
Armed Conflict, Mission Report: Visit of Major General (ret.) Patrick Cammaert, Special Envoy of the Special Representative for
Children & Armed Conflict, to Sri Lanka, 05-11 December 2009, 20 February 2010,
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2010.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/SNAA-83W4HH-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf.
No information was available at the time of writing regarding particular protection concerns of these released children.
21
See Government of Sri Lanka, Ex-LTTE combatants released to their families completing rehabilitation programs, 20 May 2010,
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MYAI-85N7VG; and Guardian, Sri Lanka’s Tamils freed – but future bleak for those
who backed Tigers, 5 April 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/05/tamils-sri-lanka-freed-tigers.
22
See Government of Sri Lanka, Ex-LTTE combatants released to their families completing rehabilitation programs, 20 May 2010,
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MYAI-85N7VG. Of these, 1,350 are reportedly classified as “criminals” and,
according to the Government, will be “dealt with according to the law”; see BBC News, Ex-Tamil Tiger fighters held in limbo, 18
May 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/10122772.stm.
23
See Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2010 -Sri Lanka, 28 May 2010,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c03a7ffb.html. It has been reported that pro-Government paramilitary groups have arrested
suspected LTTE sympathizers, but not turned them over to the police. Some of those arrested were allegedly tortured and killed; see
US Department of State, 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices -Sri Lanka, 11 March 2010,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b9e52bbc.html.
24
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, No. 48 of 1979, 20 July 1979,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4561dac84.html.
25
These include the Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulation, No. 1 of 2005, 13 August 2005,
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=46a9f2b22; and the Emergency (Prevention and Prohibition of
Terrorism and Specified Terrorist Activities) Regulations No. 07 of 2006, 6 December 2006, http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/
texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=45af76a62.
26
See, for example, Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2010 – Sri Lanka, 1 June 2010,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c1a1e9b25.html. In September 2009, 36 Tamil prisoners on hunger strike protesting against
their prolonged detention without trial at Welikada jail claimed they were beaten by prison guards; see, Amnesty International,
Amnesty International Report 2010 -Sri Lanka, 28 May 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c03a7ffb.html. See also US
Department of State, 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Sri Lanka, 11 March 2010,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b9e52bbc.html.
27
Human Rights Watch, Legal Limbo: The Uncertain Fate of Detained LTTE Suspects in Sri Lanka, 2 February 2010,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b6ae4c62.html.
28
Regulation 19 of Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulation, No. 1 of 2005, 13 August 2005,
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=46a9f2b22. Under the Regulations, the courts have no authority to
order the release of a detained person. A “surrendee”, i.e. a person who surrendered in relation to a counter-insurgency crime, can be
detained for up to two years (Regulation 22). Similarly, the PTA allows arrests without warrant, and detention for up to 18 months
without the suspect appearing before a court. Detention is initially for 72 hours, and may be extended by administrative order of the
Defense Minister for up to 18 months; see Section 9 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, No. 48 of 1979, 20
July 1979, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4561dac84.html.
29 Regulations 19(3), 21, 49 and 69(2) of Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulation, No. 1 of 2005, 13 August
2005, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=46a9f2b22.
30 Regulations Amending the Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulation, No. 1 of 2005, 2 May 2010,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4bf11e222.html.
31
Government of Sri Lanka, Parliament approves Emergency with lesser regulations, 5 May 2010,
http://www.news.lk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=15077&Itemid=44. See also Reuters, Post-war Sri Lanka
softens tough emergency laws, 3 May 2010, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/SGE6420CP.htm.
32
For example, former detainees of the Terrorist Investigation Division (TID) at Boosa Prison in Galle reported on torture methods used
there. These allegedly included beatings, often with cricket bats, iron bars, or rubber hoses filled with sand; electric shock; suspending
LTTE suspects whilst in custody;33 as well as poor prison conditions, which include severe
overcrowding and lack of adequate sanitation, food, water and medical treatment.34 According to
some reports young Tamil men, particularly those originating from the north and east of the country,
may be disproportionately affected by the implementation of security and anti-terrorism measures on
account of their suspected affiliation with the LTTE.35
In light of the foregoing, persons suspected of having links with the LTTE may be at risk on the
ground of membership of a particular social group. Claims by persons suspected of having links with
the LTTE may, however, give rise to the need to examine possible exclusion from refugee status.36
2. Journalists and Other Media Professionals
Notwithstanding the end of the conflict, restrictions on media independence and freedom are reported
to persist, including restricted access to certain regions of the country.37 Despite a reduction in the
number of high-profile attacks on media professionals since June 2009, concerns continue to be
voiced in relation to journalists, publishers and other media personnel, who report critically on
sensitive matters.38 A variety of reports indicate that such journalists could be subject to intimidation,
harassment, physical attacks, arbitrary detention and disappearances.39 Politically motivated
individuals by the wrists or feet in contorted positions, abrading knees across rough cement; burning with metal objects and
cigarettes; genital abuse; blows to the ears; asphyxiation with plastic bags containing chili pepper mixed with gasoline; and near-
drowning.; see US Department of State, 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices -Sri Lanka, 11 March 2010,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b9e52bbc.html. See also UK Home Office, Report of Information Gathering Visit to Colombo,
Sri Lanka 23-29 August 2009, August 2009, paras. 1.76-1.77, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ae066de2.html.
33
A significant number of detainees, including LTTE suspects, have allegedly died in custody, 26 of whom died in the first six months
of 2009 alone; see Freedom House, Countries at the Crossroads 2010 -Sri Lanka, 7 April 2010,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4be3c8db0.html. Recent figures of deaths in custody were not available at the time of writing.
34
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, Manfred Nowak -Addendum, A/HRC/13/39/Add.6, 26 February 2010,
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?c=173&su=172. See also US Department of State, 2009 Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices -Sri Lanka, 11 March 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b9e52bbc.html.
35
It is reported that Tamils are frequently harassed at army checkpoints in Colombo. Furthermore, police reportedly refuse to register
Tamils originating from the north and the east of the country, a requirement for temporary residence in Colombo, sometimes forcing
them to return to their homes; see US Department of State, 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices -Sri Lanka, 11 March
2010, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b9e52bbc.html. According to a Swiss Embassy official, persons arrested during cordon
and search operations were mostly young Tamils from Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaithivu, and other places in Vanni, and to some extent
Tricomalee. Women with a Vanni national identity card were also reportedly targeted; see UK Home Office, Report of Information
Gathering Visit to Colombo, Sri Lanka 23-29 August 2009, August 2009, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ae066de2.html.
Based on the available country of origin information, the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority has recently found that
“those most likely to be of interest to authorities at the checkpoints are young Tamil males originating from the north and east of the
country, particularly those with: a profile or history of LTTE links; scarring consistent with wounds sustained in hostilities; no
identity card or other identity documentation; no Colombo address; an outstanding arrest warrant or criminal record; no
employment or other verifiable reason (such as study) for being in Colombo and those without family or other networks in Colombo
on which to rely for support”; see Refugee Appeal No. 76466, 11 June 2010, para. 77,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c2dd1b12.html. See also UK Asylum and Immigration Tribunal country guidance in TK
(Tamils -LP Updated) Sri Lanka CG [2009] UKAIT 00049, 11 December 2009,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b2613ca2.html.
36
Please refer to Section III (C) of these Guidelines for further guidance relating to exclusion from international refugee protection.
37
Reporters Without Borders, World Report 2010 – Sri Lanka, 9 March 2010, http://en.rsf.org/report-sri-lanka,79.html. In June 2009,
the Government re